Phlips Louis

Applied industrial economics / edited by Louis Phlips. - Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998. - xi, 443 p. : ill. ; 26 cm.

Table of CONTENTS
Introduction 1
I: MARKET STRUCTURE 31
1. Game Theory and Industry Studies 33
2. Game Theoretic Models of Market Concentration 52
3. Expanding Markets 62
4. Declining Markets 81
5. Empirical Evidence 98
II: INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND PRICING SCHEMES 121
6. Intertemporal Pricing Schemes 123
7. Spatial Pricing Schemes 152
8. Best-Price Policies 174
9. Vertical Pricing Schemes 188
10. Price Discrimination in a common Market 196
11. Tacit Collusion(1) 232
12. Tacit Collusion (2) 249
III: COMPETITION POLICY 267
13. Collusion and Predation 269
14. Vertical Restraints 284
15. Franchising Agreements 295
16. Joint R&D Ventures 318
IV: MERGERS AND MERGER CONTROL 325
17. Unprofitable exogenous Mergers 327
18. Profitable Horizontal Mergers and Welfare 340
19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 368
20. Cournot and Merger Control 375
21. Vertical Mergers 382
22. Enforcement of the US Merger Guidelines 393
23. Enforcement of the European Merger Regulation 413

Index 436

Includes bibliographical references and index.

0521620546 (hardback) 0521629543 (pbk.) 9780521629546


Industrial organization (Economic theory)

338.5